Civilian Understanding of High-Level Military and Intelligence Operations

An Analysis

Introduction

High-level military and intelligence operations are complex, nuanced, and often shrouded in secrecy for national security reasons. Civilians, lacking direct experience or clearance, may misinterpret these operations due to limited information, experience and lack of exposure.

This analysis aims to detail the various areas and perspectives where misunderstandings commonly occur. My background in this topic stems from my military service, where I held a TS/SCI clearance for over 15 years. I also witnessed numerous media reports and news story’s on specific topics that lacked substantial information to formulate accurate and detailed reports.

This dynamic has persisted for the 2.5 centuries of our existence. It’s the nature of the beast due to the need to protect methods, technology, and sources to preserve national security. Unfortunately, many high-level military individuals often face unequal and uneven perceptions from the public and media.

My aim is to clarify the nuances at play, even for the most experienced high-level investigative reporters. The individuals reporting on General Flynn and high-level clandestine and military operations are akin to kindergarteners trying to solve high school-level algebra. I hate to be so blunt, but that is the fact.

Nature of Military and Intelligence Operations

Estimating the Civilian Access to Information on High-Level Military and Intelligence Operations

Complexity and Secrecy

Operational Security (OPSEC):

Classification Levels: High-level operations typically fall under various classification levels such as Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret, often including Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). These classifications are designed to protect national security by restricting access to individuals with the appropriate clearance.

Public Access: Civilians generally have access only to unclassified information. According to the Information Security Oversight Office, approximately 50 million classification decisions are made annually, indicating the vast amount of information that is kept from public view .

Percentage Estimate:

Classified vs. Unclassified: It is estimated that less than 5% of the total information about high-level operations is accessible to the public. This includes official reports, declassified documents, and media releases.

Remaining Information: The remaining 95% or more remains classified and inaccessible to civilians, covering detailed operational plans, intelligence sources and methods, and real-time decision-making processes.

Multi-layered Strategies:

Operational Complexity: High-level military operations involve multiple layers, including strategic, operational, and tactical levels, each with specific objectives and intricacies. These operations may involve coordination among various military branches (e.g., Army, Navy, Air Force), intelligence agencies (e.g., CIA, NSA), and allied forces.

Civilian Understanding: Civilians typically only see the outcomes or high-level summaries of these operations, often provided by official press releases or media coverage. The detailed planning, inter-agency coordination, and tactical execution are generally not disclosed.

Percentage Estimate:

Accessible Information: Civilians might have access to approximately 10-15% of the information regarding the strategic objectives and general outcomes of operations. This includes official statements, press conferences, and occasional declassified documents.

Restricted Information: The remaining 85-90% of detailed operational strategies, coordination mechanisms, and real-time execution plans are typically classified and beyond civilian access.

Overall Estimate:

Civilians have access to less than 10% of the total information related to high-level military and intelligence operations. This includes high-level summaries, outcomes, and selectively declassified documents.

The vast majority, over 90%, remains classified to protect national security and ensure the effectiveness of ongoing and future operations.

Estimating Civilian Access to Information on Specialized Knowledge in Military and Intelligence Operations

Specialized Knowledge

Technical Expertise:

Cryptography: The field of cryptography involves the creation and analysis of secure communication techniques that protect information from third parties. This includes encryption algorithms, cryptographic protocols, and secure communication systems. Cryptography knowledge is highly specialized and typically accessible only to professionals in the field or those with specific academic or technical backgrounds.

Cyber Warfare: Cyber warfare encompasses offensive and defensive operations involving computers and networks. This includes hacking, cyber espionage, and cyber defense mechanisms. The technical skills required for cyber warfare are complex and involve a deep understanding of computer science, network security, and software development.

Counterintelligence: Counterintelligence operations are designed to protect against espionage, sabotage, and other intelligence threats. This field requires knowledge of surveillance techniques, information security, and human intelligence (HUMINT) operations. Here are the main category’s surveillance techniques:

• SIGINT (Signals Intelligence)

• HUMINT (Human Intelligence)

• GEOINT (Geospatial Intelligence)

• MASINT (Measurement and Signature Intelligence)

• OSINT (Open Source Intelligence)

• CYBINT/DNINT (Cyber Intelligence/Digital Network Intelligence)

• FININT (Financial Intelligence)

• TECHINT (Technical Intelligence)

• IMINT (Imagery Intelligence)

• ACINT (Acoustic Intelligence)

Percentage Estimate:

Accessible Information: Civilians might have access to approximately 5-10% of the basic concepts and general knowledge in these fields through public sources, educational materials, and media reports.

Restricted Information: The remaining 90-95% involves classified methods, detailed technical procedures, and real-world applications, which are not accessible to the public.

Strategic Decision-Making:

Geopolitical Considerations: Military and intelligence leaders make strategic decisions based on a comprehensive understanding of global political dynamics, economic conditions, and diplomatic relations. These considerations often involve classified intelligence assessments and geopolitical analysis.

Long-term Strategic Goals: Decision-making also involves long-term planning and the integration of military objectives with national security policies. This requires a deep understanding of military strategy, logistics, and international relations.

Percentage Estimate:

Accessible Information: Civilians can access around 10-15% of the high-level strategic objectives and public policy decisions through official statements, policy documents, and news reports.

Restricted Information: The detailed intelligence assessments, specific strategic plans, and classified geopolitical analyses comprise the remaining 85-90% of the information, which is not publicly available.

Compounding Factors Leading to Civilian Misunderstanding

Technical Complexity:

Specialized Terminology: The use of technical jargon and specialized terminology in fields like cryptography and cyber warfare can be confusing to civilians, leading to misinterpretations of the actual operations and their implications.

Advanced Skills: The technical skills required for these operations are typically acquired through years of training and experience, which civilians without such backgrounds lack, leading to gaps in understanding.

Secrecy and Misconception:

Operational Security: The need to maintain secrecy around specific techniques and capabilities prevents full disclosure, causing civilians to speculate or rely on incomplete information.

Media Representation: Media coverage often oversimplifies or sensationalizes aspects of military and intelligence operations, which can distort public perception.

Geopolitical and Strategic Nuances:

Lack of Context: Without access to the full scope of classified information, civilians may not understand the broader context of strategic decisions, leading to oversimplified or incorrect conclusions.

Complex Decision-making: The intricate nature of decision-making processes in military and intelligence operations, involving multiple variables and long-term goals, is not always apparent to the public.

Overall Estimate:

Civilians have access to approximately 10% or less of the specialized knowledge related to technical expertise and strategic decision-making in military and intelligence operations. The vast majority of this information remains classified and inaccessible to the general public.

Estimating Civilian Access to and Understanding of High-Profile Military and Intelligence Cases

High-Profile Cases and Public Perception

Case Studies

General Michael Flynn:

Public Perception: Flynn’s involvement in intelligence operations and his subsequent legal battles have been subject to public scrutiny. The information available to civilians often comes from media reports and official statements, which lack comprehensive context, and in the case of General Flynn, highly bias.

Legal Battles: General Flynn’s guilty plea for lying to the FBI about his contacts with the Russian ambassador and his later pardon by President Trump highlight how public perception can be influenced by political narratives and incomplete information. The pressure that the Department of Justice imposed on the Flynn family had unseen nuances that led to General Flynn’s initial legal decisions. 

Outcome: Department of Justice (DOJ) moved to dismiss the case against Michael Flynn in May 2020, arguing that the FBI’s interview with Flynn a his statements were not material to any viable counterintelligence investigation. However, Judge Emmet Sullivan did not immediately grant the dismissal and instead appointed former federal judge John Gleeson to argue against the DOJ’s motion  .

President Trump’s pardon of Flynn, issued on November 25, 2020, was indeed described by some as a move to prevent further legal and emotional distress for the Flynn family, who had been embroiled in legal battles for several years. The pardon was exceptionally broad, covering any potential offenses related to the Mueller investigation, effectively ending all legal proceedings against Flynn  .

Regarding Flynn’s son, Michael Flynn Jr., there were reports that he was under investigation as part of the broader inquiry into Flynn’s work, particularly related to lobbying efforts on behalf of Turkey. It was suggested that the pressure on Flynn Jr. may have influenced Flynn’s decision to cooperate initially with Mueller’s team. Although Flynn Jr. was not charged, the scrutiny he faced added to the overall pressure on Flynn during the investigation. 

Michael Flynn’s business partner, Bijan Rafiekian (also known as Bijan Kian), was charged alongside Flynn in relation to lobbying work conducted on behalf of Turkey. Rafiekian was indicted on charges of acting as an unregistered foreign agent and conspiring to violate lobbying laws. In July 2019, he was convicted on both counts.

However, in September 2019, U.S. District Judge Anthony Trenga overturned Rafiekian’s conviction, citing insufficient evidence to sustain the charges. The judge ruled that the government had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Rafiekian had knowingly and willfully acted as an unregistered agent of Turkey or that he had conspired to do so. 

Unusual Circumstances That Deserves Attention:

The most obvious unusual circumstance that deserves attention is the fact that none of what I’ve just reported is mainstream news. Even among our community. That is concerning, deeply concerning, especially coming from the two individuals that’s pushing so hard for this narrative of general Flynn being a nefarious deep state actor. Let that sink in. 

Overturning of Rafiekian’s Conviction: It is relatively uncommon for a judge to overturn a jury conviction due to insufficient evidence. This decision indicates that the judge found significant issues with the prosecution’s case or the evidence presented. 

Judicial Review: Judge Emmet Sullivan, overseeing Flynn’s case, did not immediately grant the DOJ’s motion. He appointed a former judge to argue against the dismissal, highlighting the contentious nature of the decision. This from my understanding is what prompted President Trump to create a broad pardon for general Flynn. And rightfully so.

Percentage Estimate:

Accessible Information: Civilians likely have access to around 30-40% of the information about Flynn’s case through media, public records, and legal documents. And even this percentage was severely biased.

Restricted Information: The remaining 60-70% of detailed intelligence operations, behind-the-scenes legal negotiations, and classified information remain inaccessible.

General David Petraeus:

Operational Secrecy: Petraeus faced legal issues over mishandling classified information while serving as CIA Director. This case illustrates the challenges of maintaining operational secrecy under public scrutiny.

Public Scrutiny: The complexities of his role and the sensitive nature of the information involved were often oversimplified in media coverage .

Percentage Estimate:

Accessible Information: Civilians might access approximately 25-35% of information through media and public statements.

Restricted Information: The detailed operational context, classified intelligence, and internal deliberations remain about 65-75% inaccessible to the public.

Historical Context

Cold War Operations:

Covert Activities: During the Cold War, covert operations by the CIA, such as those in Latin America and Southeast Asia, were often misunderstood by the public. The lack of transparency and the complex geopolitical strategies involved led to widespread misconceptions .

Percentage Estimate:

Accessible Information: Civilians may have access to about 20-30% of the historical context through declassified documents and historical analysis.

Restricted Information: The remaining 70-80% of detailed strategies, classified operations, and intelligence assessments remain undisclosed.

Vietnam War:

Phoenix Program: Operations like the Phoenix Program aimed at counterinsurgency in Vietnam were controversial and poorly understood by civilians. The media coverage at the time often lacked the depth needed to fully explain the objectives and methods .

Percentage Estimate:

Accessible Information: Civilians could access around 30-40% of information via historical records and declassified documents.

Restricted Information: The remaining 60-70% includes detailed operational tactics and classified assessments not available to the public.

Communication Gaps

Lack of Transparency

Necessary Secrecy:

Information Protection: To protect sensitive operations, military and intelligence agencies often maintain a high level of secrecy, which can create a transparency gap. This gap leads to civilian mistrust and misunderstandings about the nature and purpose of operations .

Percentage Estimate:

Accessible Information: Civilians might have access to 20-30% of the rationale behind operations through official statements and limited declassifications.

Restricted Information: About 70-80% of the detailed information remains classified to protect national security.

Public Relations Challenges:

Communication Struggles: Military and intelligence agencies face challenges in effectively communicating their activities without compromising operational security. This can lead to misinterpretations and public relations issues .

Percentage Estimate:

Accessible Information: Approximately 30-40% of the communication efforts are visible to the public.

Restricted Information: The remaining 60-70% of detailed explanations and strategic rationales are kept confidential.

Engagement with Media:

Responsible Coverage: Encouraging accurate and responsible media coverage can help bridge the gap between public perception and reality. This involves training journalists and providing them with the necessary background to report on military and intelligence matters accurately. This also includes enforcing accountability on poorly reported military, and intelligence matters.

Percentage Estimate:

Accessible Information: Civilians might have access to about 30-40% of accurate media coverage on these topics.

Restricted Information: The remaining 60-70% of detailed, accurate reporting is limited by media constraints and the need for operational secrecy.

Overall Estimate:

Civilians generally have access to about 20-40% of the information related to high-profile military and intelligence cases, historical context, and communication efforts. The remaining 60-80% remains classified or poorly understood due to the inherent secrecy and complexity of these operations.

Estimating Civilian Access to and Understanding of Legal and Ethical Considerations in Military and Intelligence Operations

Legal and Ethical Considerations

Legal Framework

Classified Information:

Handling and Disclosure: The handling and disclosure of classified information are governed by strict legal frameworks, including the Espionage Act and Executive Orders on classification. These laws are designed to protect national security by restricting access to sensitive information.

Civilian Understanding: Civilians may not fully understand the complexities of these legal frameworks, including the processes and criteria for classifying and declassifying information.

Percentage Estimate:

Accessible Information: Civilians might have access to about 20-30% of the basic principles and legal frameworks governing classified information through public laws, official guidelines, and media summaries.

Restricted Information: The remaining 70-80% involves specific legal interpretations, detailed handling procedures, and classified guidelines that are not publicly accessible.

Accountability:

Oversight Mechanisms: High-level operations are subject to various oversight and accountability mechanisms, including congressional oversight committees, the Inspector General, and internal audits. These mechanisms ensure that operations comply with legal and ethical standards.

Visibility: However, these oversight activities are often not visible to the public, leading to perceptions of unaccountability.

Percentage Estimate:

Accessible Information: Civilians might access around 30-40% of information about oversight mechanisms through public reports, hearings, and media coverage.

Restricted Information: The detailed internal reviews, classified oversight reports, and specific accountability measures make up the remaining 60-70% that are not publicly accessible.

Ethical Dilemmas

Moral Ambiguities:

Balancing Security and Liberties: High-level operations often involve difficult ethical decisions, such as balancing national security needs with individual civil liberties. These decisions are contentious and can be misunderstood by those without a military or intelligence background.

Public Misunderstanding: Civilians may misinterpret these moral dilemmas due to a lack of context and understanding of the operational imperatives.

Percentage Estimate:

Accessible Information: Civilians might understand about 20-30% of the ethical considerations through public debates, media reports, and academic discussions.

Restricted Information: The nuanced ethical debates, classified operational decisions, and internal ethical guidelines make up the remaining 70-80% that are not publicly accessible.

Conclusion: 

Understanding high-level military and intelligence operations requires recognition of the inherent complexity, secrecy, and specialized knowledge involved. Accusations from two low-level journalists, who claim that anyone who disagrees with them is engaged in psychological operations, indicate a lack of responsibility and poor research capabilities. Their inability to accurately report on General Flynn’s well-documented legal issues, which are readily available through open sources, highlights their ineptitude in analyzing high-level clandestine and intelligence operations. This must be addressed, and these individuals should be held accountable.

It's important to make clear that asking questions is not the issue. The problem lies in making severe accusations without a deep understanding of the subject and a refusal to learn due to personal biases against General Flynn.

These biases are evident.

It appears these individuals are acting with nefarious intentions rather than seeking the truth.

Written by SpartanAltsobaPatriot -17thSOG

References:

DoD Information Security Program: Overview, Classification, and Declassification

Military Resources: Classified/Declassified Records

The Protection of Classified Information: The Legal Framework

Congressional Access to Classified National Security Information

Operations Security Impact On
Declassification Management Within The
Department of Defense

Congressional Research Service

National Declassification Center (NDC)

FOIA

Executive Order 13526

Presidential Laws and Regulations

EO 13526 Title 3—The President Classified National Security Information, This order prescribes a uniform system for classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying national security information

Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ): The UCMJ addresses military justice and discipline, including the enforcement of rules regarding the handling of classified information.

DoD Directive 5205.07 ("Special Access Program Policy"): This directive establishes DoD policy and responsibilities for SAP management and oversight. It details the procedures for creating, classifying, and handling SAPs within the DoD.

DoD Directive 5105.42 ("Defense Security Service"): Renamed as the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA), this directive relates to the protection of classified information within the defense industrial base.

DoD Instruction 5220.22 ("National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual"): This instruction provides procedures for the DoD Industrial Security Program, relevant to the management of classified information in the defense contractor community.

National Security Classification

NARA and Declassification

Classified National Security Information